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WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT DATA: HOW DIGITAL
MONOPOLIES ARISE AND WHY THEY HAVE POWER AND
INFLUENCE
Daniel McIntosh
Abstract
Over the last 10 years, while we have seen the emergence of digital
technologies able to improve human welfare, we have also seen the
unparalleled concentration of that technology into the hands of a few
global behemoths such as Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Facebook, and
Apple (Big Tech). However, we would be wise to tame this runaway
concentration of power in Big Tech; the recent revelations about the role
that Facebook data played in the United States presidential election
provides a stark illustration as to why.
This Article will analyze how and why the monopolization of digital
technology occurred. In particular, this Article examines the role of
intangible property, such as data and intellectual property, as well as the
phenomenon known as the "network effect." Intellectual property has
been suspected of driving the monopolization of digital platforms.
However, intellectual property is normally an afterthought and does little
to prevent competition with the core business of Big Tech companies.
Rather, what allows these companies to monopolize their business is the
network effect acting on data in a positive feedback loop.
Dealing with the problems of a network effected market has always
been difficult. In the past, competition regulations were the go-to tools.
However, such regulations have so far proven largely ineffective because
data does not fit squarely into traditional economic models. The other
traditional alternative was consumer law. Even though we will soon see
the implementation of stricter data protection laws with the introduction
of the GDPR in Europe, its primary focus is on individual privacy, not
monopolized power.
This Article will argue that the reason for the ineffectiveness of laws
to deal with some of the harmful effects of Big Tech monopolies is that
there is something about monopolies on data that is inherently different
from other more benign goods or services. Data is information. It is this
distinctive characteristic of data that has implicated Big Tech
monopolization across such a broad range of fields, including personal
privacy, democracy, security, innovation stifling, hacking, political
influence, and media. So, while re-imagined competition and consumer
regulations may work to prevent inflated prices and Draconian privacy
policies, they will not address the more pressing problems of Big Tech
monopolies on data.
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INTRODUCTION

The digital age is here and its benefits offer a tantalizing glimpse of
its promise to democratize institutions and provide increased access to
information, tools, and power for all.' At its loftiest, the digital age may
even empower the most underprivileged. But will we witness a revolution
that tears down established institutions, or will we witness the
introduction of a new technology that, like others before it, is ultimately
controlled by an elite few?

1.

KAREN MOSSBERGER ET AL., DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP: THE INTERNET, SOCIETY, AND

PARTICIPATION (2008); Dirk Helbing & Evangelos Pournaras, Build Digital Democracy, 527
NATURE

33 (2015).
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Digital technology has provided universal and widespread
empowerment in an extremely short amount of time, a phenomenon that
has not occurred arguably since the invention of the printing press. 2 The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
recently described digital technology as having "as much importance as
electricity, water, [and] highways." 3 A 2012 World Bank report on
international development said that "[m]obile communication has
arguably had a bigger impact on humankind in a shorter period of time
than any other invention in human history." 4 For example, a middle class
African in Kenya has access to the same iPhone owned and used by tech
billionaire Elon Musk.s
It would not be an overstatement to say that digital technology has the
power to solve, or at least substantially ameliorate, the current challenges
we face. Such challenges include the environment, gender inequality, 6
institutionalized tyranny, disease, and inequitable civil participation. 7 To
ensure digital technology reaches its potential, we must push and pull the
appropriate levers.
At the birth of digital technology in the nineties, there was great
excitement about the internet and its ability to free people. It would be
democratic and open. However, this rosy optimism was perhaps a little
premature. Now, in 2019, we are in the midst of an era in which large
technology companies penetrate and influence the citizenry in ways not
previously possible for private enterprises.
The top five most valuable companies in the world are no longer real
estate owners or oil companies, but the Big Tech companies: Apple,

2. In Africa, mobile telephone usage went from two percent in 2000 to around ninety
percent in 2014. Murithi Mutiga & Zoe Flood, Africa Calling: Mobile Phone Revolution to
Transform Democracies, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2016, 2:00 PM), www.theguardian.com/world/
2016/aug/08/africa-calling-mobile-phone-broadband-revolution-transform-democracies.
3. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Big Data: Bringing CompetitionPolicy
to the DigitalEra: Note by Annabelle Gawer, at 15, DAF/COMP/WD(2016)74 (Dec. 16, 2016)
[hereinafter Gawer Note], https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2016)74/en/pdf.
4. WORLD

BANK,

INFORMATION

AND

COMMUNICATIONS

FOR DEVELOPMENT

2012:

MAXIMIZING MOBILE 11 (2012).
5. Cell Phones in Africa: CommunicationLifeline, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 15, 2015),
www.pewglobal.org/2015/04/15/cell-phones-in-africa-communication-lifeline.
6. Those working in international development continually explain that the best way to
end poverty is the education of women. Surely digital technology is the greatest tool for doing so
in countries where cultural norms and dogma make it difficult. See, e.g., Ana Revenga & Sudhir
Shetty, Empowering Women Is Smart Economics, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 2012, at 40.
7. MARTA POBLET & ENRIC PLAZA, DEMOCRACY MODELS AND CIVIC TECHNOLOGIES:

TENSIONS, TRILEMMAS, AND TRADE-OFFS (2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317
164590_DemocracyModels-andCivicTechnologiesTensionsTrilemmasandTrade-offs.
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Alphabet,8 Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook. 9 In just the first quarter of
last year, these five companies amassed $25 billion USD in profits. 10
Only fifteen years ago, Facebook did not exist, Google had only a loyal
following,11 and Amazon was just selling a few books.
There is now a widespread feeling, both in the public and in the
mainstream press, that Big Tech has too much power over many aspects
of our lives. 12 The recent revelations about the role that Facebook data
played in the United States presidential election provides one disturbing
example of the platforms. 13 Google has been able to monopolize
information in other ways, placing itself in prime position to capitalize
on future innovation, especially in the field of artificial intelligence
(AI). 14 Most of the concerned discussion has centered around the various
manifestations of data monopolization, such as data privacy, media
influence, and lack of consumer choices. However, few have been able
to tease out precisely what it is that provides Big Tech with its power and
influence.
This Article will analyze how and why the monopolization of digital
technology has occurred. Part I examines the possible driving factors in
the monopolization of digital technologies, focusing in particular on the
contribution of intangible property, such as data and intellectual property,
and the phenomenon known as the network effect. It is the network effect

8. Alphabet Inc. is Google's parent company.
9. As of Mach 2017, the market capitalization in USD are: (1) Apple: $754 billion;
(2) Google: $579 billion; (3) Microsoft: $509 billion; (4) Amazon: $423 billion; and
(5) Facebook: $411 billion. PwC, GLOBAL TOP 100 COMPANIES BY MARKET CAPITALIZATION 32
(2017), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit-services/assets/pdf/global-top-100-companies-2017final.pdf. See also, The World's Largest Public Companies, FORBES, www.forbes.com/global
2000/list/#header:marketValuesortreverse:true (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).
10. The World'sMost Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, ECONOMIST, May 6,
2017, at 9, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resourceis-no-longer-oil-but-data.

11. Lucy Hooker, How Did Google Become the World's Most Valuable
Company?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-35460398.
12. See, e.g., Xavier Rizos, The Age of Internet Empires, ABC NEWs (Dec. 19, 2013,
5:21 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-20/rizos-the-age-of-internet-empires/5168818

("[T]he internet has shifted from the free innovative market people still imagine towards a
juxtaposition of private empires . . . ."); Robert B. Reich, Opinion, Big Tech Has Become Way
Too Powerful, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/opinion/isbig-tech-too-powerful-ask-google.html.
13. See David Folkenflik, Facebook Scrutinized Over Its Role in 2016's Presidential
Election, NPR (Sept. 26, 2017, 4:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/26/553661942/facebookscrutinized-over-its-role-in-2016s-presidential-election.
14. Robert Wright, Google Must Be Stopped Before It Becomes an AI Monopoly, WIRED
(Feb. 23, 2018,
8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-artificial-intelligencemonopoly/.
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that has provided Big Tech companies with their monopolies by acting
on data in such a way as to create a data-opoly.
Part II discusses the current legal measures being utilized to combat
such monopolization. While the two primary streams of law-consumer
and competition law-are showing some positive progress in addressing
problems associated with data monopolization, especially in the
European Union (EU), they continue to focus on the symptoms rather
than the causes of monopolization. This Article argues that the difficultly
in dealing with data monopolies is likely due to the nature of data itself.
As explained in Part III, it is the subject matter of the monopoly-big
data, with its myriad of applications-that is the core of the power and
influence of companies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon. Part IV
presents some solutions, the most promising being the use of digital
technology itself, namely blockchain technology, to solve the problem of
the monopolization of big data.
I. THE DRIVERS OF MONOPOLIZATION
A. IntellectualProperty
Any analysis of the monopoly power of companies that work largely
with intangible products1 5 requires an investigation of intellectual
property-the legal demarcator of ownership of intangibles. 16 Intellectual
property is undoubtedly an imperative for tech companies, evidenced by
the number and value of patents they own. 17 However, of the monopolies
15. Google is not a product you can buy and put into your hands, Facebook is not a plumber
fixing your toilet, and Amazon is not a shop whose shelves you can peruse. Tangible property,
such as a bicycle or real estate, is physically exclusive. The owner (or user) of a bike will use it
to the exclusion of all others as it cannot be used by others at the same time. Intangible property
never finds itself in such a conundrum. This crucial difference is the reasoning behind the legal
protection for intellectual property.
16. James Eyers, Facing Up to the IP Tsunami, AUSTL. FIN. REv., Aug. 11, 2009, at 61,

https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-wipo/en/dgo/interviews/pdf/gurry-afr_09.pdf
(explaining that intellectual property is set to become the basis of competition in the future); see
also Manoj P. Dandekar, Managing Director, Enter. Econ. Evaluation, Presentation at the Society
of Depreciation Professionals Annual Conference: Valuation of Intangible Assets and Intellectual
Property (Sept. 11, 2017), https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.depr.org/resource/resmgr/2017
Conference/2017Presentations/MDandekarValuationlntangible.pdf (explaining that the definition
of the intellectual property sets its boundaries and limits, that the boundaries represent the scope
of the commercial intangible assets, and that-generally-the value and power of some
companies should be evaluated based on the value of these intangible assets).
17. The key role intellectual property plays in digital technology can be evidenced by the
number and value of patents owned by companies in digital technology. In the mid-1990s, the
United States courts opened the door to allow software patents. By the end of the '90s, there were
20,000 software patents per year being granted in the United States. By 2013, that figure had
tripled to 68,000 software patents. See James E. Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18
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that have presented themselves on the digital landscape, few trace their
initial establishment to intellectual property. It is only after a company's
rise to dominance and wealth that it seeks to bolster its position with
intellectual property rights. For example, Microsoft had only five patents
in its first fifteen years, while now-as a billion-dollar company-it
applies for 2,000 patents annually.18 Similarly, Google's surprising $12.5
billion purchase of Motorola-a stagnant company at the time-was
largely considered to be motivated by the latter's 17,000 patents. 19
Although these extensive intellectual property portfolios may inhibit
competition, 2 0 they tend not to cover the core of a Big Tech monopoly's
business. Take Facebook as an example. While it was arguably
innovative in its initial concept in 2004,21 the core of Facebook's business
today is scarcely protected by intellectual property apart from the
trademark on its name. Facebook's website is not covered by any
significant patents and its functionality could be re-coded over the course
of a weekend by a group of Finnish teenagers. 22 Even the appearance of

B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 241, 253 (2012). Their wealth is also largely intangible. While more

traditional large companies like McDonald's and Exxon may have had incredible wealth in land
or machinery, the Big Tech companies are asset poor by comparison, clearly preferring intangible
property. For example, in 2016, Apple had $20 billion in cash, $216 billion invested, and only
$27 billion in property, plants, and equipment. Apple Company Financials, NASDAQ,
www.nasdaq.com/symbollaapl/financials?query=balance-sheet
(last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
Indeed, Apple does not even care to own its factories. See Malcolm Moore, Why Apple Can 't
Control Its Chinese Factories, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 5, 2010, 7:27 AM), https://www.telegraph.
co.uk/technology/apple/7375684/Why-Apple-cant-control-its-Chinese-factories.html.
18. Issie Lapowsky, EFF:If You Want to Fix Software Patents, Eliminate Software Patents,
WIRED (Feb. 25, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/02/eff-eliminate-softwarepatents/.
19. Amir Efrati & Spencer E. Ante, Google 's $12.5 Billion Gamble, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16,
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903392904576509953821437960; see
also Brian Womack & Zachary Tracer, Google Agrees to Acquire Motorola Mobility for $12.5
Billion, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2011, 4:48 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201108-15/google-agrees-to-acquisition-of-motorola-mobility-for-about- 12-5-billion.
20. Many commentators have pointed out that intellectual property is not particularly
well-suited to encouraging innovation in the field of digital technology because unlike other fields
such as pharmaceuticals, where the process of innovation is "long, risky and expensive," it seems
all you need to start a software company is a computer and, of course, a garage. See Steve
Brachmann, How Tech's Ruling Class Stifles Innovation with Efficient Ingringement,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/17/tech-ruling-classstifles-innovation-efficient-infringement/id=79391/.

21. Sarah Phillips, A Brief History, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2007, 5:29 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia.
22. Ravi Kumar, How to Create Your Own Website like Facebookfor Free?, GET

EVERYTHING, www.geteverything.org/how-to-create-your-own-website-like-facebookfor-free/ (last updated Oct. 20, 2017).
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the website could, within limits, be copied without breaching the
company's intellectual property. 23
Google finds itself in a similar situation. Google's initial PageRank 24
technology-developed by Larry Page and Sergey Brin as part of a Ph.D.
project at Stanford University-was groundbreaking at the time and was
rightly granted a patent. 25 Despite the impending expiration of the
PageRank patent and the existence of superior search algorithms that
competitors have already invented, however, nobody is questioning
whether Google's search engine, which accounts for 85% of Google's
$136.2 billion USD revenue through advertising, 26 is under imminent
competitive threat. The same lack of intellectual property protection
applies to other dominant platforms such as Airbnb, Uber, eBay, and
Amazon.
B. The Network Effect
If digital technology companies generating billions of dollars-whose
functionalities can be so easily copied-are not protected at their core by
intellectual property, what then is thwarting competitors? The broadly
accepted answer is what economists call the network effect. 27
A network effect occurs where the benefit to a user of a product or
service increases as the number of users increases, a sort of user begets
user scenario. 2 8 A classic example is the fax machine. While the benefit
of owning the first fax machines was minimal, the benefit increased

23. Mark Davison & Ian Horak, Shanahan's Australian Law of Trade Marks and
Passing Off (5th ed. 2012).
24. Danny Sullivan, What Is Google PageRank? A Guide for Searchers and
Webmasters,
SEARCH
ENGINE
LAND
(Apr.
20,
2007,
1:18
AM),
https://searchengineland.com/what-is-google-pagerank-a-guide-for-searcherswebmasters-1 1068.
25. John Battelle, The Birth of Google, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2005, 12:00 PM),
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l 3.08/battelle.html?pg=2&topic=battelle&topicset=.
26. ALPHABET INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 7, 26-27 (2018), https://abc.xyz/
investor/static/pdf/2017_google-annualreport.pdf?cache=5504fde.
27. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,

86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998) ("A Network effect exists where purchasers find a good more
valuable as additional purchasers buy the same good.").
28. A network effected market is not always undesirable. There can be benefits
from the enabling of interactions between a consumer and others who own the product.
The "benefits of a purchaser, in other words, is access to other purchasers." Id. at 488.
For example, the Apple app ecosystem is a strongly network-effected market, yet there
have been countless new and useful apps created by all levels of entrepreneurs and
newcomers. See Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz & Florencia Garcia-Vicente, Network Effects
on the iPhone Platform: An Empirical Examination, 39 TELECOMMS. POL'Y 877, 877-

79 (2015) (discussing how Apple's business platform has grown under network effects).
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exponentially as more people adopted the technology. Other examples
include rail gauges and telephone lines.
Digital platforms have a high propensity to undergo network effects
because they function on interoperability and communication with other
similar products and users. 29 In the beginning, a new platform, a website
service or app, needs to adequately meet some need. Then, the
pervasiveness of the platform's use, which is the result of its initial
success, 30 also serves as the driver for its further uptake. 3 1 In the case of
Microsoft Office, once it became the dominant word processor, user
familiarity and software compatibility meant that more and more users
were encouraged to adopt the product, resulting in an arguably inferior
product at an inflated price.
While a network effect does not inevitably result in a "winner takes
all" outcome, 32 the consensus in the literature appears to be that for digital
platforms like software and websites, the network effect is the main

29. A great example can be seen in keyboards. While the Dvorak keyboard has been shown
to allow for a more rapid typing speed, the QWERTY keyboard is more widespread, making it
not worthwhile for a typist to learn Dvorak typing. See Matthew T. Clements, Inefficient Standard
Adoption: Inertia and Momentum Revisited, 43 EcON. INQUIRY 507, 507-08 (2005),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doilepdf/10. 1093/ei/cbi034.
30. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27, at 495-96; see Paul Klemperer, Network
Effects and Switching Costs: Two Short Essays for the New Palgrave (Mar. 2005) (unpublished
essays), www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/NewPalgrave.pdf.

31. Economic modeling has shown that, in this way, a market share of 40% can
lead to an almost automatic increase to 80% of the market share. Timing is important,
as the first-mover or best-timed product-rather than the superior product-is often
triumphant. See John T. Soma & Kevin B. Davis, Network Effects in Technology
Markets: Applying the Lessons of Intel and Microsoft to Future Clashes Between
Antitrust and IntellectualProperty, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3, 46 (2000).

32. See Gawer Note, supra note 3, at 9. In the OECD Committee Hearing,
Germany noted that the network effect may lead to a winner takes all scenario, while
Professor Annabelle Gawer explained that this is also not a given and there are many
"counterexamples of markets with network effects that have not been monopolised."
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Summary of Discussion of Hearing on
Big Data:Annex to the Summary Record of the 126th Meeting Competition Committee,

at 2, 5, DAF/COMP/M(2016)2/ANN2/FINAL (Apr. 26, 2017) [hereinafter OECD Big
Data
Hearing
Summary],
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M(2016)2/ANN2&docLanguage=En2
2, 2017). Further, the OECD reports that "the very specific features of the digital
economy imply that, in many cases, firms compete for the market instead of competing
in the market, leading to 'winner takes all' outcomes, as it was observed when Facebook
was able to displace Myspace as the most popular social network. Org. for Econ.
Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital
Era: BackgroundNote by the Secretariat, at 17, DAF/COMP(2016)14 (Oct. 27, 2016)
[hereinafterBackgroundNote by the Secretariat].
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determinate of market dominance. 3 3 As tech billionaire and Facebook's
first outside investor Peter Thiel says, "competition is for losers." 34 His
recommendation: "If you want to create and capture lasting value, look
to build a monopoly." 35
C. Data Driven Network Effect
The network effect needs a network. The network effects observed
previously were due to physical manifestations such as telephone lines or
rail gauges. 36 More recently, a new form of network effect has loomed
into view in the digital world. It is conceptually similar to the walled
gardens of intellectual property seen in early digital technology: a
network effect not in relation to compatibility, but rather, in relation to
data. The data-opoly. 37
Markets with a high reliance on data are experiencing positive
feedback loops: the more data an enterprise has, the better the product.
This leads to strong data-driven network effects. A search engine like
Google is able to improve its search results by using the immense data its
search database continually collects from its billions of users. 38 This may
include popular search queries that are easily answered, as well as the
more obscure and rare searches that can only be well served with gigantic
datasets. The same principle enables Facebook to improve its content and
to target users with sublimely specific advertising on account of the sheer
volume of user data it possesses. 39
With so many inputs, big data and its processing are now capable of
what is known as "now-casting":40 real-time forecasting of traffic
conditions, restaurant crowds, 4 1 or flu outbreaks. Discovering such
information requires a huge volume of data from which the data of
33. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Data-opolies 8, 11 (Univ. of Tenn.
Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 316, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927018.
34. Peter Theil, Competition Is for Losers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014, 11:25 AM),
www.wsj.com/articles/peter-thiel-competition-is-for-losers-1410535536.

35. Id.
36. Note, Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company: A Development in the Law of Public
Utilities, 44 HARV. L. REv. 833, 834 ("Of utilities, the telephone industry presents the most

notable instance of centralized organization and monopolistic control.").
37. See MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION

POLICY (2016)
33.

(coining the term "data-opoly"); see also Stucke & Grunes, supra note

38. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 33, at 6.
39. See id. at 11.
40. Now-casting is defined as "the prediction of the present, the very near future and the
very recent past." Marta Banbura et al., Now-Casting and the Real-Time Data Flow, in 2
HANDBOOK OF ECONoMIC FORECASTING 195, 196 (Graham Elliott & Allan Timmermann eds.,
2013).

41. See sources cited supra note 32.
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interest can be extracted. Otherwise, the data would be collected at too
low a frequency to enable now-casting.
Size matters when it comes to data. Stucke and Grunes demonstrate
that a poorly designed algorithm can find more valuable information and
insights in high volumes of various data than a superior algorithm can
when working with a cleaner, but smaller, dataset. 42 Google's chief
scientist admitted: "We don't have better algorithms than anyone else.
We just have more data." 43 The end result is that consumers may be
locked into using a dominant service such as Google rather than their
preferred service, which may offer them better privacy options or less
advertising.
This is why Facebook, Google, and Amazon offer their social, search,
and e-commerce platforms for free. Rather, they receive user data as their
remuneration. So, although Google, 44 Microsoft, 4 5 and Facebook 46 often

claim that competitors can easily gather their own data and that
competition is therefore just "one click away" 4 7 because "data is not
valuable per se," 48 the evidence increasingly suggests otherwise. 4 9 If data
were not valuable, there is little to explain why Facebook paid $16 billion
USD to purchase WhatsApp, a company of only 60 employees and no
assets.5 0 In reality, data is acting as an entry barrier to many

42. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 37, at 23.

43. Matt Asay, Tim O'Reilly: "Whole Web" Is the OS of the Future, CNET (Mar.
18,
2010),
www.cnet.com/news/tim-oreilly-whole-web-is-the-os-of-the-future/
(quoting Peter Norvig, chief scientist at Google).
44. OECD Big Data Hearing Summary, supra note 32, at 3 ("[D]ata does not
necessarily act as a barrier to entry since, regardless of its size, data is nowadays very

cheap to collect, can be easily generated . . . .") (statement of Hal Varian, Chief
Economist at Google and Professor at Berkeley School of Information).
45. Id. at 4 ("[D]ata is abundant and has only value when properly structured and
categorised.") (statement of Chris Meyers, Associate General Counsel of Antitrust from
Microsoft).
46. See Case M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 32104M7217,
12 (Mar. 10, 2014).

47. Eric Schmidt, Why Google Works, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2015, 4:14
PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-schmidt/why-googleworks_b_6502132.html.
48. OECD Big Data HearingSummary, supra note 32, at 3 (statement of Prof. Hal
Varian).
49. Id. at 2 ("Big Data has blurred the line between [supply and demand] allowing
users of an online service to behave simultaneously as consumers and suppliers of data.
In turn, that data can be immediately used by the service provider to improve the quality
of the service, leading to a real-time feedback loop that was not observed before.").
50. Facebook to Acquire WhatsApp,
FACEBOOK
(Feb.
19,
2014),
https://newsroom.fb.com/ news/2014/02/facebook-to-acquire-whatsapp/.
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competitors.5 1 In 2016, the OECD, the French Autorit6 de la
Concurrence, and the German Bundeskartellamt all acknowledged the
existence of data-driven networks and that they give a competitive
advantage over rivals. 52
II. CURRENT MEASURES
A. Introduction
The law is struggling to find solutions to the new challenges of Big
Data. 53 In the context of privacy and security of big data, as explained by
one commentator, current legislation "is still grounded in, and focused
upon the twentieth century's responses-to the . . . processing and
distribution of data . ... 54
The current legislative go-to tools of regulators to combat data
monopolization are competition law and consumer law. As discussed
below, competition law is arguably ineffective at resolving intellectual
property and network-effected monopolies, and seems even less equipped
to deal with data because it currently has no real market. With the soon
to be introduced EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),ss
consumer law is shaping up to be a sharper tool for willing regulators.
But at its heart, it remains a bastion of the individual consumer versus
Big Tech and does not consider the impact of Big Data monopolization
from the perspective of the bigger picture of creating a better society.
B. Competition Law
Prior to the arrival of data-opolies, there had been some partial success
in limiting network effects using competition regulations, or antitrust
laws as it is known in the United States. In the late nineties, Microsoft
held an 80% market share. 56 However, on the back of an antitrust suit, the
51. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 33, at 2-6; Inge Graef, Market Definition and
Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms, 38 WORLD COMPETITION 473,

473 (2015).
52. Autorit6 de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, Competition Law and Data, at 15-16
(May 10, 2016), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%
20Data%20Papier.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=2.
53. See generally id.
54. Pompeu Casanovas et al., Regulation of Big Data: Perspectives on Strategy, Policy,
Law and Privacy, 7 HEALTH & TECH. 335, 340 (2017).
55. See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
56. Tim Worstall, Microsoft'sMarket ShareDropsfrom 97% to 20% in Just over a Decade,
FORBES (Dec. 13, 2012, 11:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/12/13/
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United States government was able to persuade Microsoft to share its
programming interfaces with other companies. 57
There is a glut of analysis on the effectiveness of competition
regulations as applied to digital technologies prior to the emergence of
Big Data.5 8 The inadequacies of these regulations in addressing
network-effected markets, however, has been attributed to the features
unique to a network-effected monopoly that differ from a natural
monopoly. 59 In the case of a natural monopoly, as demand increases, the
margins decrease according to classic economic principles of the scale of
production, whereas in a network-effected market, value is added by
existing users through increased demand.6 0
The literature reveals that while the lawmakers recognized the
outcome-the monopoly-they struggled 6 1 with understanding the
contribution of the network effect. Even by 2001, "[o]nly a few courts in
antitrust cases [had] recognized the existence of network effects, and
attempted to factor it into their analysis." 62 Further, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has not lodged a serious case against Big Tech this
century. Consequently, they largely failed in limiting the prevalence of
network-effected markets. Perhaps the most compelling evidence is the
fact that the five most valuable companies in the world today are Big
Tech companies 63 who owe a large part of their value to network effects.
Even apart from dealing with the complexities of a network market,
there is the additional difficulty that data, unlike word processing
software, is currently not valued. When most of the services in question

microsofts-market-share-drops-from-97-to-20-in-just-over-a-decade/#6409340351cf.

57. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537, 539-40 (D.D.C. 1997).
58. E.g., Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust,
and Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837 (2007); Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual
Property Rights at the Crossroad Between Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant
Position: American and European Approaches Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 455 (2006); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27.
59. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27, at 484 ("While the two problems may be
difficult to distinguish in practice-and some courts may treat them the same-the two
cases are analytically distinct and therefore may require different legal treatment .....
60. Gawer Note, supra note 3, at 9; Soma & Davis, supra note 31, at 5.
61. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 27, at 485 ("The theoretical implications of
network markets have not been fully elaborated even in the economic literature. The
theoretical legal analysis that has drawn upon such literature is even less complete, and
empirical data on the behavior of firms and consumers in network markets is scarcer
still.").
62. Soma & Davis, supra note 31, at 6.
63. Lucinda Shen, Here Are the Fortune 500's 10 Most Valuable Companies, FORTUNE
(May 21, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/21/fortune-500-most-valuable-companies-2018/.
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are offered for free to its users and the data collected is not later sold, it
is "particularly difficult" 64 to assess market power and value. 65
However, there has been a notable change in Europe in the last two
years. There is now a growing recognition that data can be used as a
barrier to entry and that data-opolies are problematic. 66 Last year, the
European Commission handed Google a record-breaking E2.42 billion
fine for abusing its dominance as a search engine by giving illegal
competitive advantage to its own services in the lucrative online shopping
market. 67
In November 2016, addressing concerns raised by Big Data and
data-driven network effects, the OECD conducted an investigation into
what it considered a "first step in a broader work stream" 68 in "identifying
some of the competition challenges from the increasing use of consumer
data for business purposes, and to discuss possible reactions by
competition authorities and other agencies." 69 The report outlines its view
that the problem of too much concentration of data in so few companies
could be best remedied with appropriately adapted competition laws. 70
The report states that "[t]raditional antitrust tools can be adapted and
applied to tackle such data-related anticompetitive practices, by treating
data as any other input. For instance, in merger control and exclusionary
abuse cases, competition authorities may consider the risks of foreclosure
and design remedies accordingly."71

64. BackgroundNote by the Secretariat,supra note 32, at 16.

65. In collecting the data itself, the platform is not doing anything that is considered
anti-competitive under the traditional analysis. This is precisely why the EU regulator
decided to look no further when assessing any possible anti-competitive issues regarding
the aforementioned $19 billion USD Facebook/WhatsApp merger. Facebook answered
all concerns by showing they did not sell data or charge for their services. See Case
M.7217, supra note 46, at 12.
66. See, e.g., Stucke & Grunes, supra note 33, at 5-6; Autorit6 de la Concurrence
and Bundeskartellamt, supra note 52, at 11.
67. European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google

E2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own
Comparison Shopping Service (June 17, 2017), europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-17-1784_
en.htm.
68. BackgroundNote by the Secretariat,supra note 32, at 5.
69. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Big Data: Bringing CompetitionPolicy
to the Digital Era: Executive Summary, at 4, DAF/COMP/M(2016)2/ANN4/FINAL (Apr. 26,
2017) [hereinafter OECD Executive Summary], https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/
M(2016)2/ANN4/FINAL/en/pdf.
70. Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note 32, at 5 (noting that initially, the
concerns of big data and its implications were around consumer protection, but that after several
high-profile mergers and the increasing amount of monopolization and control of data, the
outcome on competition and the broader implications for markets need to be considered.).
71. OECD Executive Summary, supra note 69, at 4.
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In the same way, Graef suggests a reworking of competition law to
where, instead of looking at purely price indications of monopoly, it
would look at other qualities in determining when antitrust provisions
should be triggered.72 More recently, in December 2017, Germany's
Federal Cartel Office, the Bundeskartellamt, made its preliminary
assessment that Facebook was using its dominance to extort personal data
from users by bullying them into agreeing to their unfavorable privacy
terms and conditions.7 3 This is likely to be the first time a regulator is
using data as a measure of anti-competitive practices.
C. Consumer Law
Consumer law protections are also routinely cited in data regulation
discourse. Amongst the literature, there is an acknowledgement that
collection of data and its misuse may harm consumer interests, including
privacy, data protection, freedom of speech, consumer choice, and
non-discrimination rights.7 4 The OECD summarizes the situation as
follows:
The development of the digital economy and of Big Data
has raised concerns that users of online services may lose
control over the way that their data is collected and used. In
the absence of a regulatory framework that promotes
transparency and consumer's control over their own data,
there is a risk of undermining the good functioning of the
digital markets.75
The introduction of the GDPR on May 25, 2018, initiated deep and
sweeping changes into how personal data is managed in Europe and for
72. Graef suggests a more objective measure of the data power of an enterprise

would be to "look at their ability to monetize the collected information. The revenue
gained by a provider through licensing of data to third parties, delivering targeted
advertising services or offering other paid products and services to customers having
data as input indicates how successful it is in the market." Graef, supra note 51, at 502.
73. The case had not been finalized at the time of the preliminary assessment. The
Bundeskartellamt gave Facebook time to respond and negotiate. The proceedings were
administrative, not offense proceedings with the potential for fines. Bundeskartellamt Press
Release, PreliminaryAssessment in Facebook Proceeding: Facebook's Collection and Use of
Data from Third-Party Sources Is Abusive (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_12_2017_Facebook.html.
74. Executive Summary of the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on
Effective Enforcement in Digital Society Economy, 2016 O.J. (C 463) 8, 8, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016XX1213(01)&qid=15650045915
43&from=EN; European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on Coherent Enforcement of
Fundamental Rights in the Age of Big Data, at 5 (Sept. 23, 2016), https://edps.europa.eu/
sites/edp/files/publication/16-09-23_bigdatatopinion-en.pdf.
75. OECD Executive Summary, supra note 69, at 5.
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EU citizens. 76 The aim of the GDPR is to give EU citizens far-reaching
rights and control over their personal data.7 7 The strict data compliance
framework will be enforced by severe penalties of up to E20,000,000, or
in the case of an undertaking, up to four percent of the total worldwide
annual turnover, 7 8 which could potentially mean millions or even billions
of euros in fines. These strong sanctions perpetuate the EU's increased
willingness to regulate Big Tech-something yet to be seen in the U.S.
The GDPR provides citizens various rights in relation to their data,
namely, the right of access to their personal data, 79 the right to be
forgotten, a requirement that consent to collect personal data be freely
81
htt2nt
82
given, a right to notification of any data breach, and a right not to be
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing. 83 Most

significantly, the GDPR introduces a "data portability right," which gives
a person the right to be able to transfer his or her personal data from one
provider to another. 84 This data portability was introduced with
individual rights in mind. However, it may have a significant impact on
competition as users are able to easily switch platforms. Thus, the GDPR
operates in the "intersection between data protection and other fields of
law (competition law, intellectual property, consumer protection, etc)." 8 5
Personal data portability is novel-it has no precedent in any previous
framework of law. 86 The GDPR gives no mechanism for effectuating
portability other than that data must be in a "commonly used and
machine-readable format and . . . [transmitted] to another controller
without hindrance . .
87 It remains to be seen how data controllers will
execute the portability.

76. Dale Walker & Keumars Afifi-Sabet, What Is GDPR? Everything You Need to Know,
from Requirements to Fines, ITPRO (July 23, 2019), https://www.itpro.co.uk/itlegislation/27814/what-is-gdpr-everything-you-need-to-know.
77. Id.
78. Regulation 2016/679, supra note 55, at 83.
79. Id. at 43.
80. Id. at 43-44 ("The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the
erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have
the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay .....
81. See id. at 37.
82. Id. at 52-53.
83. Id. at 46.
84. Id. at 45; Paul De Hert et al., The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: Towards
User-CentricInteroperability of Digital Services, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 193, 194
(2018).
85. De Hert et al., supra note 84, at 193.
86. See id. at 203.
87. Regulation 2016/679, supra note 55, at 45.
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De Hert argues that the right to data portability may have two possible
scenarios. 8 The first would require only the transfer of "provided"
personal data. In contrast, the second and wider scenario would require
the transfer of all data, including data that is generated from the personal
data. 89 In supporting the latter, broader definition, De Hert says:
This scenario does not only encourage a real competition
between service providers (limiting barriers for users willing
to change service in the digital market), but it also avoids the
monopolisation of the Internet by large companies, by
encouraging interoperable formats, developing multilevel
platforms where the centre is the user and the actors are
different service providers. 90
However, as the implementation of the GDPR is considered to be its
biggest challenge and greatest unknown, 91 it is difficult to predict any
impact it will have on reducing data monopolization. Furthermore, the
real aim of the GDPR is to protect personal privacy-not to regulate
competition by proxy. Finally, only personal data falls within its gambit 92
and so it will not address problems on monopolization of big data
generally.
D. Inadequacy of CurrentRegulations
This two-pronged regulatory approach, using appropriately retooled
antitrust and consumer laws, shows promise in reducing the monopolistic
state of digital platforms, particularly in Europe where regulators are
starting to show some real teeth. In practice, however, both streams of
law are ill-equipped to fully resolve the issues of big data monopolization
because they merely address the downstream manifestations of big data,
but not the origin of the problem: the monopoly itself. Consumer law may
ensure users have better privacy policies and competition law may
prevent large anticompetitive mergers, though this remains to be seen.
Perhaps even a version of media pluralism laws could ensure that large
platforms do not have so much media influence. However, even if
successful, the other downstream consequences of big data
monopolization will remain.

&

88. De Hert et al., supra note 84, at 202.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 194.
92. See Miranda Mourby et. al., Are "Pseudonymised" Data Always Personal Data?
Implications of the GDPR for Administrative Data Research in the UK, 34 COMPUTER L.
SECURITY REV. 222, 222 (2018) (discussing whether Article 4(5) of the GDPR, dealing with
"pseudonymization," will have the effect of expanding the scope of personal data).
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Most notably, Big Data is set to become key for future innovation and
growth. 93 Especially in the field of artificial intelligence, companies such
as Google have an enormous head start, as Big Data is the fuel from which
artificial intelligence runs.9 4 For example, Tesla collects data from its cars
which it then uses to optimize its self-driving algorithms and thus
operates in a data-driven, network-effected market-making it difficult
for competitors to innovate ahead of Tesla. 9 5 However, this application
of big data does not appear on the radar of antitrust or consumer law.
This is why Stucke questions "whether competition law is the
appropriate tool for dealing with issues arising from the use of Big
Data." 96 Part of the failure of competiton law is likely to be that Big Data
is just so new-its usefulness and implications are only a few years old.
It is only in the last two years that legal scholars and governments have
begun to discuss the issue of monopoly ownership of Big Data as a
problem in itself.97 Thus, while the OECD investigation of data
monopolies pondered how to ensure that monopolies face "competitive
pressure to constantly improve their products and preserve low prices," 9 8
it made no mention of the distinction in power and influence between
Facebook and Uber.
III. WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT DATA

A. Data Is Different
Efforts thus far to address the consequences of the centralized power
of Big Tech have attended to the symptoms, but not the underlying
problem. Data monopolies are different from previous monopolies
because there is another dimension to the nature of data that other, more
benign goods or services do not have. It is the nature of the data itself93. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR

INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 2, 6 (2011), https://www.mckinsey.com/-/
media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/McKinsey%20Digital/Our%20Insights/Big%20data%
20The%20next%20frontier%20for%20innovation/MGI-big-data-full-report.ashx
("[0]ur
research suggests that we are on the cusp of a tremendous wave of innovation, productivity, and
growth .... The use of big data is becoming a key way for leading companies to outperform their
peers. For example, we estimate that a retailer embracing big data has the potential to increase its

operating margin by more than 60 percent.").
94. Christian Ehl, Data the Fuel for Artificial Intelligence, MEDIUM (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://medium.com/@cehl/data-the-fuel-for-artificial-intelligence-ed90bf141372.
95. Bernard Mar, The Amazing Ways Tesla Is Using Artificial Intelligence and Big Data,
FORBES (Jan. 8, 2018, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/01/08/theamazing-ways-tesla-is-using-artificial-intelligence-and-big-data/.
96. BackgroundNote by the Secretariat,supra note 32, at 5.
97. See, e.g., Stucke & Grunes, supra note 33, at 8; Autorit6 de la Concurrence and
Bundeskartellamt, supra note 52, at 11.
98. BackgroundNote by the Secretariat,supra note 32, at 17.
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in being akin to information-that has produced consequences across
such a broad range of fields, including personal privacy, democracy,
security, innovation stifling, hacking, political influence, and media. To
put it into the context of the first historic network-effected monopoly,
what we are seeing today would be something analogous to if the Bell
Telephone Company had not only the monopoly on the physical
telephone lines, but also on the recording and analysis of the
conversations traveling through the lines, as well as control over 80% of
the major newspapers-all while being the world's largest company. 99
This highlights why data, with its likeness to information itself, can allow
companies like Google and Facebook to create monopolies that are
fundamentally different from our previous experience with
network-effected monopolies like Microsoft Office.
When a data set becomes so vast and ubiquitous that it encompasses
wide-ranging fields of human endeavor, then the controller of that data
likewise becomes a powerful gatekeeper and influencer. When data is
amassed-as Big Data is now-it is no longer something passive with
discrete application, like a car, but something with all-inclusive utility.
Rather, it transforms into knowledge-which can be political, personal,
influential, private, or even confidential-and an essential element to
innovation.
Not all data-opolies have as much power, value, and influence as
Facebook and Google, however, because a data-opoly's dominion
depends on the type and variety of data. For example, Airbnb may
essentially have a data-opoly over share accommodation, but it is simply
not in a position to impact an election or act as a filter to our experience
of the world. Similarly, Tesla may be in a data-driven network-effected
market but, again, this data would seem to be limited to transport.
B. Data Is Big
In 2014, IBM estimated that 90% of the data in the world had been
created in the previous two years alone.100 Data is no longer concerned
only with stock information such as a person's name, email address, sex,
and age. It now encompasses unstructured data from multiple, unlikely
sources, including anything from dietary habits, heart rate, location,
99. Morgan Stanley estimated in 2016 that 85% of all online advertising expenditure would
go into Google or Facebook. Jason Kint, Google and Facebook Devour the Ad and Data Pie.
Scraps for Everyone Else, DIGITAL CONTENT NEXT (June 16, 2006), https://digitalcontent
next.org/blog/2016/06/16/google-and-facebook-devour-the-ad-and-data-pie-scraps-for-everyone
-else/.
100. Todd Vare & Michael Mattioli, Big Business, Big Government and Big Legal Questions,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Oct. 2014, at 46, http://www.managingip.com/Article/3382483/Bigbusiness-big-government-and-big-legal-questions.html.
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recycling habits, microenvironment rainfall, voting preference, when a
car's thermostat turns on, to sexual pronouns used in speech. This vast
unorganized data is then analyzed by sophisticated algorithms and
artificial intelligencelot to find otherwise undiscoverable-and at times
highly surprising102-insights. Hagstrom writes that "[t]he combination
of unconventional data sources, new problem-solving approaches, and
the ability to use big data to access collective knowledge will enable
organizations to devise innovative solutions to global problems." 103
Big Data has been defined as information that is characterized by the
four Vs: high volume, velocity, variety, and value. 104 It is now not so
much the quality of the data that is important, but the sheer quantity. And
over the past decade, "each 'v' has increased enormously." 10 But the
most noteworthy increase has been in value. 106

101. See Bernard Marr, The Complete Beginner's Guide to Big Data Everyone Can
Understand, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/03/14/thecomplete-beginners-guide-to-big-data-in-2017/#45d7d6e27365 (explaining how big data is
collected and analyzed).

102. An example of a surprising find of big data was Walmart "finding that Strawberry
pop-tarts sales increased by 7 times before a Hurricane. After Walmart identified this association
between Hurricane and Strawberry pop-tarts through data mining, it places all the Strawberry
pop-tarts at the checkouts before a hurricane." How Big Data Analysis Helped Increase Walmarts
Sales Turnover?, DEZYRE, https://www.dezyre.com/article/how-big-data-analysis-helpedincrease-walmarts-sales-turnover/109 (last updated Nov. 10, 2017).

103. Mikael Hagstrom, How Big Data Can Help Solve the World's Woes, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (Oct. 25, 2015), www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/how-big-data-canhelp-solve-the-worlds-woes/.
104. Analyst Douglas Laney first defined the three "v"s of volume, velocity and
variety. Andrea De Mauro, Marco Greco, and Michele Grimaldi added the "value"
component. See Andrea De Mauro et al., A FormalDefinition of Big Data Based on Its
EssentialFeatures, 65 LIB. REV. 122, 130-31 (2016). The definition has been adopted
recently by Stucke and Grunes, as well as by the OECD Competition Committee.
STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 37, at 16.
105. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 37, at 16.

106. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Exploring Data-Driven
Innovation as a New Source of Growth: Mapping the Policy Issues Raised by "Big
Data," at 12, DSTI/ICCP(2012)9/FINAL (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/5k47zw3fcp43-en.pdfrexpires=1551680853&id=id&accname=
guest&checksum=0971F2CD3870BD189D4B81DC55EFC985. The OECD estimates
that use of Big Data by 2020 could save $500 billion USD in traffic congestion and fuel
costs by use of mobile tracking; reduce the cost of carbon dioxide emissions by E79
billion by use of smart appliances; and in the U.S. medical sector, reduce medical errors,
improve diagnosis, increase efficiency in management and pricing, foster R&D, and
achieve other goals that would allow savings of about $300 billion USD. Id. at 5.
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Data is being called "the new oil." 10 7 It is now "in every sector, in

every economy, in every organization and user of digital technology."10 8
The more information, or Big Data, the better-those who possess such
data can analyze it and make it into something useful. 109 The implications
of Big Data are likely to appear in many various guises and its
applications will be unusual and unpredictable. In this way, we would be
better off to ensure adequate regulation of Big Data itself, not merely its
discrete applications.
C. FacebookCase Study
Facebook has over two billion active users.1 10 The "Like" and "Share"
buttons appear daily on almost 10 million websites, and every sixty
seconds there are 510,000 comments posted, 293,000 statuses updated,
and 136,000 photos uploaded. 1 1 When working with such numbers, even
a slight tweak will enable seismic shifts. The data that Facebook collects
and presents to its users has inherent political significance. Facebook is,
in effect, the world's largest media company. As former Gawker founder
Nick Denton opines, "[t]he Silicon Valley . . . monopolies now
have . . . more power than the [entire traditional] media industry." 112
Facebook's capacity to affect users' behavior in society is
substantiated by its own research. Facebook funded a study that was later
published in Nature during the 2010 United States congressional
elections. By selectively giving some users an "I voted" button but not
others, the study found that the presence of the button increased the total
vote count in the election by 340,000 votes. 113 In short, Facebook was
actually able to subtly encourage 340,000 people to vote who otherwise
would not have. In another experiment, Facebook researchers 114 showed
107. The New Oil: DataIs the World's Most Valuable Resource, AUSTL. (May 6,
2017, 1:00 AM) https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/the-new-oil-data-isthe-worlds-most-valuable-resource/news-story/f386217a9c63ac5ee6el473413e90bda.
108. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 93, at 2.
109. See Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 3,
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2010/02/25/data-data-everywhere.
110. FACEBOOK, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 35 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680119000009/fb-12312018x10k.htm.
111. The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics, ZEPHORIA, https://zephoria.com/top-15valuable-facebook-statistics/ (last updated July 2019); see also, Press Release, Facebook,
Facebook Reports Second Quarter 2017 Results (July 26, 2017), https://investor.fb.com/investornews/press-release-details/2017/Facebook-Reports-Second-Quarter-2017-Results/default.aspx.
112. NOBODY SPEAK: TRIALS OF THE FREE PREss (Netflix June 23, 2017) (quoting Nick
Denton at 38:32).
113. Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and
PoliticalMobilization, 489 NATURE 295, 297 (2012).
114. Adam D. I. Kramer et al., Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional
Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. OF Sc. U.S. 87, 88 (2014).
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how manipulating the Facebook news feeds could alter moods in users.
Placing "positive emotional content" on users' news feeds resulted in
positive posts and, similarly, "negative emotional content" resulted in
negative posts. 115

Until recently, commentators questioned whether Facebook had the
data to influence a U.S. election. 116 But now that question seems to have
been answered affirmatively in light of the Cambridge Analytica and
Russian hacking scandals. Cambridge Analytica, a private data firm
"funded and promoted by secretive [billionaire] Robert Mercer," 117
worked on advertising for the Trump presidential campaign." It used
Facebook data, which it had bought from an application built by a
Cambridge University academic, of 277,000 users who consented to their
data being collected.1 19 However, Cambridge Analytica was able to mine
and scrape data from friends of the original user so that, in the end, it had
the personal data of 87 million people. 120 Using the insights extrapolated
from the data, Cambridge Analytica microtargeted advertisements to
swing voters, and all-told, the campaign launched 4,000 different ad
campaigns and placed 1.4 billion web impressions. 12 1 The way in which
Cambridge Analytica was able to microtarget and influence voters using
the data of 87 million people garnered much attention and criticism from
the media, wider public, and commentators. 122 Many believe it was
instrumental in the success of the Trump campaign to the point where it
seems to have disrupted democratic institutions.
115. The experiment is what prompted Clay Johnson, co-founder of the firm who ran the
Obama online campaign, to postulate: "Could the CIA incite revolution in Sudan by pressuring
Facebook to promote discontent? Should that be legal? Could Mark Zuckerberg swing an
election .. . ? Should that be legal?" Robert Booth, Facebook Reveals News Feed Experiment to
Control Emotions, GUARDIAN (June 29, 2014, 7:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/jun/29/facebook-users-emotions-news-feeds.
116. Michael Brand, Can Facebook Influence an Election Result?, ABC NEws (Sept. 27,
2016), www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-28/can-facebook-influence-an-election-result/7881660.
117. Sasha Issenberg, Cruz-ConnectedData Miner Aims to Get Inside U.S. Voters' Heads,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-1112/is-the-republican-party-s-killer-data-app-for-real-.
118. Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of
Millions, N.Y. TIEs (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/
cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html.
119. Olivia Solon, Facebook Says CambridgeAnalytica May Have Gained37m More Users'
Data, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2018, 6:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/
apr/04/facebook-cambridge-analytica-user-data-latest-more-than-thought.
120. Id.; Mike Schroepfer, An Update on Our Plans to Restrict Access on Facebook,
FACEBOOK (Apr. 4, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/restricting-data-access/.
121. Dirk Helbing et al., Will Democracy Survive Big Data and Artificial Intelligence?, Sci.
AM. (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-democracy-survive-bigdata-and-artificial-intelligence/.
122. Id.
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This informs us of another consequence of data monopolization. Even
if we accept Facebook's claims that it has no agencyl23 or political
interest, its role as a centralized media outlet with deep and unique
insights by virtue of data monopolization had the unintended
consequence of enabling third parties to use that data for nefarious
purposes. In response, CEO Mark Zuckerberg was called before the U.S.
congressional committee. During the hearing, Zuckerberg admitted
Facebook had failed in preventing Cambridge Analytica from gathering
the personal information of users. 124
Facebook is promising to implement a policy that aims to more clearly
explain the data it gathers on users, but not to actually change what
information it collects and shares. 125 Again, while better privacy policies
may prevent the same scenario, Facebook will continue to be the
centralized commercial entity of the personal data of its billions of users.
The GDPR will similarly force Facebook to better outline its privacy
policy. But for those who accept the policy, Facebook will still be
vacuuming up data. Thus, Facebook's influence and power will likely be
unaffected by the GDPR.
D. Google Case Study
To learn just about anything nowadays, the first instinct is to "Google
it" because Google has become synonymous with knowledge. It is the
portal through which we seek understanding. As the prism through which
we discover and see much of the world, this places Google in a unique
position of power and influence.
Google's mission is to "organize the world's information and make it
universally accessible and useful." 12 6 Even without any suggestion1 27 that
123. Facebook claims it has no agency. However, in 2016, Gizmodo broke the story that

several former Facebook "news curators" admitted that they intentionally suppressed conservative
new websites appearing in the "trending" news section despite the stories organically trending,
and conversely, "injected" news articles they preferred into the trending news section. They were
also instructed not to include news about Facebook itself. Michael Nunez, Former Facebook
Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative News, GIzMODO (May 10, 2016, 12:30 PM),
www.gizmodo.com.au/2016/05/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conservativenews/.
124. Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg's Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergssenate-hearing/?noredirect=on&utm-term=.a300d547415c.
125. Facebook Says up to 87m People Affected in Cambridge Analytica Data-Mining
Scandal, ABC NEws, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-05/facebook-raises-cambridgeanalytica-estimates/9620652 (last updated Apr. 4, 2018, 6:32 PM).
126. About, GOOGLE, www.google.com/intl/en/about/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
127. One commentator noted we now need to use new language to describe the pervasiveness
of Facebook and Google. Ellen P. Goodman & Julia Powles, Facebook and Google: Most
Powerful and Secretive Empires We've Ever Known, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2016, 3:00 PM),
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Google aims to present this information and data in anything other than a
neutral portal, acting as a gatekeeper places it in a perilous spot. And
while its famous motto is "Don't be evil," 128 it remains a commercial
enterprise with responsibilities to shareholders to maximize profits.
Google has been known to bias their search results to push its own
products ahead of competitors' products. In a leaked 2012 staff report1 29
about the dominance of Google in online searches, the FTC found that
Google was giving preference to its own products and had "adopted a
strategy of demoting or refusing to display, links to certain vertical
websites in highly commercial categories." 130 Nevertheless, the FTC
decided not to pursue the matter at the time. 13 1
Google has a "God's eye view," as the data it collects provides Google
with information that it13 2 then uses to quickly spot competitor trends and
either acquire them or out-compete them. Many believe that Al is the next
big application of Big Data in the future. But Google already has that
covered, too. It has the largest number of Al experts in the world and has
invested £400 million into DeepMind, 133 a program that aims to "solve
intelligence"-a nice addition to go alongside hundreds of other start-ups
Google has bought. 134 Last year, at the launch of its Pixel 2 phone in San
Francisco, Google announced its plans to transition from a "mobile-first"

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/28/google -facebook-powerful-secretiveempire-transparency ("Google is not an 'engine' that simply drives us to an objectively correct
destination . . . . Facebook is not merely a 'network' for connection, like the old phone network

or electrical grid, as if it had no agency . . . . These are not mere 'edge providers,' peripheral to
infrastructure, or mere 'applications' that we can select or refuse.").
128. Julian Assange, Opinion, The Banality of "Don 'tBe Evil," N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/opinion/sunday/the-banality-of-googles-dont-be-evil.html;
Kate Conger, Google Removes "Don'tBe Evil" Clause From Its Code of Conduct, GIzMODO
(May 18, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://gizmodo.com/google-removes-nearly-all-mentions-of-dont-be-

evil-from-1826153393.
129. Brody Mullins et al., Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of Google, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19,
2015, 7:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google-142
6793274.
130. Excerpts from FTC Google Report, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 6:30 PM),
graphics.wsj.com/ftc-google-report/.
131. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Settlement is the Largest FTC
Penalty Ever for Violation of a Commission Order (Aug. 9, 2012), www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.
132. ECONOMIST, supranote 10.
133. Sam Shead, The Founders of Google DeepMind Are Investing in a Startup That Lets
You Talk to a Doctor Through Your Smartphone, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2016, 3:10 AM),
www.businessinsider.com.au/deepmind-cofounders-invest-in-babylon-health-2016-1.
134. Jennifer Elias, Google'sAcquisitionsArein the Spotlight 15 Years After It Went Public,
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/19/googles-best-and-worst-acquisitions-are-in-the-spot
light-15-years-later.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2019, 12:20 PM).
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business to an "Al-first" business. 135 If Al and the data it runs on is set to
be the future of innovation, then Google is in the lead.
Like all large companies, Google also has more traditional power.
According to Professor Reich, "Google is now among the largest
corporate lobbyists in the United States. Around the time of the [FTC]
investigation the company poured money into influencing both the
commissioners and the commission's congressional overseers."136
Another example of the power of Big Data is Google's ability to
predict influenza epidemics. By analyzing user searches for flu
symptoms, it is able to predict outbreaks. There is even one report that
Google was able to predict regional outbreaks of the flu up to ten days
before the outbreaks were reported by the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention in the U.S. 137 Google did not start out in the business of
epidemiology. However, data enabled it to be a possible world leader in
the field.
Google has found itself in this powerful data monopoly primarily on
the back of a single innovation twenty years ago. However, it has no
obligation or incentive to give access to its data, nor to explain how its
algorithms function. The data we provide Google, and also Facebook, is
extremely personal. In some way, each probably knows more about us
than all our friends combined. Google knows what we say (Gmail), watch
(YouTube), think (Google search), look like (Google Photos), buy
(Google Wallet), where we drive (Maps), who we meet and where
(Google Calendar), and it only just stopped short of wanting a live stream
of our entire lives (Google Glass). This personal and sensitive aspect
further illustrates the special nature of data as a commodity that makes it
unlike any previous commodity controlled by centralized, commercial
entities.
E. Data as Something More
These two case studies highlight the dark side to a data-opoly-the
consequences of the monopolistic data control that Google and Facebook
have over personal information, news media, information generally, and
collective knowledge-to which neither competition nor consumer laws
speak directly. To the civil rights advocate, the problem is that the
personal data of the individual is being misused. To the economist,
however, the problem is one of monopolistic prices and inferior goods.
135. Peter Marks, Pixel 2: The Smartphone Age Is Over and Google Thinks AIIs Next, ABC
NEws (Oct. 5, 2017, 3:19 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-05/google-pixel-2heralds-the-ai-age/9018636.
136. Reich, supra note 12.
137. Stucke & Grunes, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 7; see also Miguel
Helft, Google Uses Searches to Track Flu's Spread, N.Y. TIMVEs (Nov. 11, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/technology/internet/12flu.html.
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Thus, the economic analysis is skewed towards the economic
outcomes of data-opolies and how competition laws need to be re-tooled
to better fit the anti-competitive nature of a monopoly when the subject
matter is data. While higher prices and personal data privacy are serious,
rectifying them will not resolve the problem of the power and control
exercised by enterprises like Facebook and Google. At the other end,
those in the mainstream and the more specialized financial press have
been aware of the power and control issues of Facebook and Google, but
have been largely unable to pinpoint the means through which the
centralization of power was occurring: the data-opoly.
IV. SOLUTIONS

A. Changing Our View of Data
The value of digital technology, and Big Data in particular, as being
amongst the world's greatest tools in a number of respects is only recently
being discussed. Hagstrom predicts that "if the universe of data were
suddenly made available, it would unleash the creativity of
problem-solvers to combine different data sets-public and private-to
develop innovative solutions to innumerable challenges." 13 8
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that a likely reason we are not
rectifying the quasi-monopoly control of data is because we have yet to
recognize its intrinsic value. Instead, we have focused upon the
downstream glitches-until now. What follows are some suggestions for
possible solutions and are flagged here for further discussion. The
common thread of these solutions is changing how we view data.
B. Time Limiting Data
One possible solution is the implementation of a mechanism-legal
or computational-that imposes a time limit for preventing access to data.
Collected data could be given a limited term, and once expired, the
controller of the data would be compelled to make the data available for
public consumption. So, for example, when a timestamped block of data
reaches a certain maturity, say five years, 13 9 and if there are no privacy
or security issues, then it is automatically rendered open access. This
could act as the blunt tool that ultimately prevents companies from
monopolizing their useful data.

138. Hagstrom, supra note 103.
139. This would not solve the problem of monopolized Big Data that has its value in its
"velocity," such as traffic data. However, much of the big data collected now will still have
relevance in 5 years-for example, data about the human body.
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This idea is, of course, borrowed from the current regime that
regulates data's first cousin, intellectual property. 14 0 Ever since its
inception, intellectual property has experienced great difficulty in
balancing the tension between encouraging innovation and preventing
abuse of monopolistic power. 141 This is analogous to the tension inherent
to data-opolies. We recognize that data is useful and so on one hand we
want to encourage its creation and collection, while on the other hand we
want to allow access and disclosure of that data to the public. Currently,
however, there is little reason for a company to share its data. 142 Such a
shift from privately controlled data to open access will subject
data-opolies to the self-limiting mechanism in intellectual property: its
term.
C. Thinking of Data as a Commodity, Labor, or a Human Right
Currently, the data-opolies do not offer their data for sale. 14 3 Amazon,
Facebook and Google explicitly state they do not sell their users' data. 144
Instead, data is kept private for the benefit of the data-opolies. However,
if a market were established for data as a commodity, then data would no
longer be locked away but could be traded on the free market and applied
where the market determined there was a need.
140. Graef, supra note 51, at 6 (finding that data and intellectual property are non-rivalrous
goods).

141. This balance finds expression in the "bargain" of the patent regime. See Teva Canada
Ltd. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2012] 3 S.C.R. 625 (Can.) ("The patent systemis based on a 'bargain,'
or quid pro quo: the inventor is granted exclusive rights in a new and useful invention for a limited
period in exchange for disclosure of the invention so that society can benefit from this knowledge.
This is the basic policy rationale underlying the Act. The patent bargain encourages innovation

and advances science and technology.").
142. BackgroundNote by the Secretariat, supra note 32, at 28. The OECD report identified
this option but went on to say that requiring a company to share data would be an extreme remedy,
only to be used where no less intrusive alternatives existed. OECD Executive Summary, supra
note 69, at 4. A very different view is expressed by Larry Lessig when talking about intellectual
property and our fascination with absolute control, however. Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual
Property and Code, 11 J. Civ. RTs. & EcON. DEV. 635, 638 (1996) ("[W]hile we protect real
property to protect the owner from harm, we protect intellectual property to provide the owner

sufficient incentive to produce such property. 'Sufficient incentive,' however, is something less
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than 'perfect control."'). The Productivity Commission observed the same problem in the context
of confidential pharmaceutical data. See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION,
RECOMMENDATIONS 19 (2016).
143. Twitter is an exception. See Selina Wang, Twitter Sold Data Access to Cambridge
Analytica-Linked Researcher, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2018-04-29/twitter-sold-cambridge-analytica-researcher-public-data-access.
144. See Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeld=201909010 (last updated Aug. 29, 2017); Does Facebook Sell My
Information?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/152637448140583 (last visited Aug.
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In a similar way, it is also possible to view data as the labor of the user
who provided it. According to researchers studying a system for
measuring the value of individual data contributions, "[d]ata is labour." 145
In some scenarios, in times of a humanitarian crisis for example, data
is also starting to be understood as a human right. 146 Elevating data to this
position of reverence would change the mindset of both society and the
data-opolies. Such a shift in how data is viewed would encourage data
reform.
D. Blockchain Technology
The answer may not lie solely in the traditional legal frameworks,
however. As the volume of data collected surges and the nature of data
changes-as it is derived from increasingly complex and extensive global
networks-it appears that building an automated computational system
to regulate the data itself would be adequate to curb the effects of
data-opolies.
Blockchain is a very recent digital technology that employs an "open,
distributed ledger that can record transactions between two parties
efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent way." 14 7 The transactions
are recorded in data sets, called blocks, which are linked to each other by
unique hash codes, generated and timestamped by the data block itself.148
Blockchain technology is supremely well suited1 49 to solve the problem
of monopolization of Big Data: (1) it is by definition decentralized and
distributed;1 50 (2) it runs by unsupervised automated code-the best way

22, 2019); Privacy, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/googlecloud/answer/6056650?hl=en
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
145. See generally E. Glen Weyl, et al., Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving Beyond
"Free," 108 AM. EcON. Ass'N PAPERS & PROC. 38 (2018).
146. See generally FAINE GREENWOOD ET AL., HARV. HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE, THE
SIGNAL

CODE:

A HUMAN

RIGHTS

APPROACH

TO

INFORMATION

DURING CRISIS

(2017),

https://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/signalcode final.pdf.
147. Marco lansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 2017, at 118. https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain.
148. See ARVIND NARAYANAN

ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A

COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 11-12 (2016).

149. At its heart, blockchain technology provides a system whereby people and agents can
interact in a trusted and virtually frictionless transactional system. Although a very new
technology, it is already recognized-even hyped-to be particularly applicable for use in
currency, voting, data privacy management, and legal transaction of property. See Distributed
Organization, SYs. ACAD., http://complexitylabs.io/blockchain-distributed-organization/ (last
visited Aug. 22, 2019).
150. Blockchain technology distributes the load of data storage, thus dispensing of the
previously inhibitory capital costs for newcomers. See id.
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to regulate something of the massive scale of Big Data; 15 1 (3) it deals with
data, which is precisely the subject of the monopolization; and (4) it can
employ token economics

152

and smart contracts.

153

Currently, most digital platforms we use are within the Web 2.0
framework which is comprised of companies such as Google and
Facebook vacuuming up any and all data we generate and storing them
on centrally controlled data servers. However, researchers and designers
anticipate Web 3.0, where digital platforms such as Ethereum 54 -which
are open-sourced and decentralized-can be used to run platforms
previously only provided by centralized businesses. This will also solve
the barrier of large data storing infrastructure.1 5 5 The large servers needed
to physically hold the data, and the human experts and development
required to undertake the "deep" analysis is costly. 156 For example,
Microsoft considered it necessary to outlay $4.5 billion USD into
"developing its algorithms and building the physical capacity necessary
to operate Bing" 157 in its attempt to compete in the search engine market.

151. The scale of the big data is so great that the execution, enforcement, and administration
of regulations can only be realistically performed by unsupervised computational regulation,
whether it be using blockchain or artificial intelligence. It is simply impossible for a human to
comb over such large and fluctuating data to determine whether it meets the definition of
monopolized Big Data.
152. If a market was established for data as a commodity, then it could be traded and applied
where the market determined there was need. The blockchain could use token economics to
attempt to solve this using traditional economics. However, an added benefit of token economics
is that of a multivalued and fully fungible economy, allowing us to represent value otherwise not
well captured by traditional economics such as environmental or humanitarian value.
153. Smart contracts are the second generation blockchain. The additional feature is that the
blockchain also contains executable code on the blockchain in this same distributed way. The
smart contract is both defined and enforced by the code, without discretion. So more than just a
passive distributed ledger, second generation blockchains with smart contracts can perform
contractual obligations. For example, a smart contract can issue the access code for a house once
the accommodation fee is paid.
154. Ethereum is an open-source public blockchain distributed computer platform featuring
smart contracts. It was only recently created in a 2013 white paper, then went live one year later.
Who Created Ethereum?, BITCOIN MAG., https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/who-createdethereum (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
155. Data storage infrastructure involves significant costs. Background Note by the
Secretariat, supra note 32, at 11 ("[T]he information technologies required to store and process
the data can be very costly, involving vast data centres, servers, data-analytical software, internet
connections with advanced firewalls and expensive human resources, such as computer scientists
and programmers.").
156. In 2016, Amazon, Google and Microsoft spent $32 billion USD in capital expenditure
and capital leases. AUSTL., supra note 107.
157. The FTC Report on Google's Business Practices, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2015, 7:40
PM), http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/ (stating that Microsoft invested over $4.5 billion
into developing Bing on page 76 of the memorandum prepared by staffers at the Federal Trade
Commission); Stucke & Grunes, supra note 33, at 5.
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Accordingly, under Web 3.0, the data exhaust generated by users is
no longer controlled by a centralized, commercial entity. Instead, the
massive amounts of data may be managed by the user or society
collectively. The problem then is no longer one of accessing data that is
useful, but what we do with that data. This provides a huge opportunity
to employ blockchain technology to very efficiently manage the full
potential of Big Data to change our lives.
CONCLUSION

The creation of digital powerhouses such as Google, Amazon, Apple,
Microsoft, and Facebook has been largely due to a data-driven network
effect. Traditionally, mitigating network-effected markets has been
problematic. Mitigation has proved even more difficult in the case of data
monopolies because the data itself is not openly traded.
More consequential, however, is that data is unlike other goods or
services that have been monopolized previously. Data has inherent value.
As more of our activities are being digitized, the Big Data being
generated is proving to be a powerful tool across fields as varied as curing
disease, feeding the hungry, reducing gender inequality, strengthening
national security, and improving environmental and disaster responses.
Thus, when large volumes of data are marshalled and monopolized, there
is more at stake than simply higher prices and poor privacy policies.
The advent of the internet and digital technology is likely to be the
defining feature of the history of humankind in this century. Its promise
is great and so too is its potential for misuse. If data is to be the driving
force behind this new technology, we must manage it well with the
implementation of new laws for the purpose of preventing the misuse of
data. Alternatively, we could possibly even look to digital technology
itself to build an automated computational system of regulation.

